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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) constitute one of the most promising third-millennium technologies and have wide range
of applications in our surrounding environment. The reason behind the vast adoption of WSNs in various applications is that they have
tremendously appealing features, e.g., low production cost, low installation cost, unattended network operation, autonomous and
longtime operation. WSNs have started to merge with the Internet of Things (IoT) through the introduction of Internet access capability
in sensor nodes and sensing ability in Internet-connected devices. Thereby, the IoT is providing access to huge amount of data,
collected by the WSNs, over the Internet. However, owing to the absence of a physical line-of-defense, i.e. there is no dedicated
infrastructure such as gateways to watch and observe the flowing information in the network, security of WSNs along with IoT is of a
big concern to the scientific community. More specifically, for the application areas in which CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability)
has prime importance, WSNs and emerging IoT technology might constitute an open avenue for the attackers. Besides, recent
integration and collaboration of WSNs with IoT will open new challenges and problems in terms of security. Hence, this would be a
nightmare for the individuals using these systems as well as the security administrators who are managing those networks. Therefore,
a detailed review of security attacks towards WSNs and IoT, along with the techniques for prevention, detection, and mitigation of those
attacks are provided in this paper. In this text, attacks are categorized and treated into mainly two parts, most or all types of attacks
towards WSNs and IoT are investigated under that umbrella: “Passive Attacks” and “Active Attacks”. Understanding these attacks and
their associated defense mechanisms will help paving a secure path towards the proliferation and public acceptance of IoT technology.
Index Terms—Cryptography, Detection, DoS, IoT, Prevention, Survey, WSN, 6LowPAN, RPL, Block-chain, TSCH, MQTT, CoAP,
CoAPs, 6LowPSec, 6TiSCH.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENT developments in wireless communications andMicro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technolo-
gies facilitated the design of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs), in which sensor nodes collect the intelligible data
from their surrounding environments and share them in a
wireless fashion to send the information towards a mean-
ingful data sink. According to scientific predictions, the total
number of wireless sensors deployed is expected to reach 60
trillion at the end of the year 2022, meaning 10 thousand
sensors for every person on the world [1]. Therefore, all
the problems and challenges concerning WSNs will expose
plentiful topics for the researchers.
Owing to their easy and cheap deployment features,
WSNs has wide-scale application areas in science as shown
in Fig. 1: To monitor environment-related events (such
as wildfire, earthquake, ocean, pollution, water quality,
wildlife), to collect information regarding human-related
activities and observation of human behavior (such as
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elder-care, nursery, healthcare), to provide mission-critical
information (such as military operations, highway traffic);
to monitor industrial sites (such as industrial automation,
manufacturing machinery performance), and so on [2].
Internet of Things (IoT) is revolutionizing the IT sector
and will be next big leap of the technology following In-
ternet. IoT market is expected to grow from more than 15
billion devices in 2015 to more than 75 billion in 2025 [3].
This prediction means that on average, each person on earth
will have at least 25 personal IoT devices in 7 years time.
Henceforth, IoT is expected to have a dramatic impact on
our lives in near future [4]. During this period, WSNs will
be integrated into IoT and innumerable sensor nodes will
join the Internet aiming at cooperating with other nodes to
sense and monitor their environment. IoT will provide an
interaction between people and environment by using the
WSNs more and more in near future [5]. For instance, our
earth will benefit from this integration by the result of the
increased environmental awareness [6].
The vision behind IoT is to let people and smart things
to be connected at any time, in any place, to anything and
anyone, via any network and service [7]. So by following
this vision, application areas of IoT will increase continu-
ously and dramatically for every aspect of life. For example,
nowadays, with the diverse installation of IoT devices, we
are able to remotely sense and act upon situations regarding
our houses or offices. E.g. in an event of intrusion to the
premises, an alert can reach to our smartphone asking
immediate attention or trigger an automatic response on
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Fig. 1. Various application fields of IoT enabled WSNs.
our behalf. The pictures and videos being taken can be sent
directly to the police so that they may approach the crime
scene better prepared with the intelligence they gathered in
advance.
Security in WSNs and IoT, is an important issue, espe-
cially if they are commissioned for mission-critical tasks.
For instance, in tactical military applications where a se-
curity gap in the network could cause casualties for the
friendly forces on a battlefield. Another example would be
from health-care sector (IoT applications): A recent paper
[8] revealed that most of the current used systems fail
to embed strong security services that could be preserve
patient privacy. None of the patients would be happy if their
confidential health data were exposed through the leakages
from misbehaving nodes or due to system failures.
Algorithms and methodologies designed for securing
WSNs will be relevant to any IoT that comprises one or
more sensor networks. As also mentioned earlier, WSNs
most probably will be integrated with IoT in the near future
[9]. Therefore, all cyber-security related issues, especially
attacks, their prevention and mitigation are very important
for establishing secure and reliable IoT.
WSNs are vulnerable to a wide range of attack types
which might put critical threats to the security of those
networks. Therefore these attack types need to be inves-
tigated thoroughly. Security related attacks against WSNs
can be branched into two main categories: Active attacks
and Passive attacks. In the passive attacks category, attackers
are generally hidden (camouflaged) and either damage the
functioning components of the network; or tap the commu-
nications link to collect useful information. Passive attacks
can also be further categorized into eavesdropping, node
destruction, node malfunctioning, node outage and traffic
analysis types. Whereas in the active attacks category, an
attacker effects the functions and operations of the targeted
network. The result of this ill-effect can be the real objec-
tive of the attacker and can also be detected by security
mechanisms (intrusion detection). For instance, network
services might be vulgarized as a consequence of this type
of attacks. Active attacks can also be further categorized
into jamming, flooding, Denial-of-Service (DoS), blackhole,
wormhole, sinkhole and Sybil types.
In Computer Science, solutions to defend against secu-
rity attacks towards networks comprise of three essential
components [2]:
• Prevention: This component aims at preventing at-
tacks before they happen. In this case, any proposed
method needs to be able to devise measures to de-
fend against the specific type of attack(s). Intrusion
prevention mechanisms can resist external attackers
towards WSNs and IoT, but they are not specifically
designed to resist the internal attackers.
• Detection: In an event of an attack, if an adversary
manages to advance the measures taken by the pre-
vention component, this means that defense against
the attack has failed. At the moment, security solu-
tions that are devised for the detection component
of the related attack would take in-charge and work
at especially in identifying those nodes that are com-
promised. The only way of reacting against ongoing
attacks, especially internal attacks, is using the In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDSs). After an intrusion
is detected, then a mitigation mechanism would be
issued to minimize the adverse effects of the ongoing
attack.
• Mitigation: Final component aims at mitigating at-
tacks after they happen, for example, in order to
secure network, a security measure should be taken,
such as ‘dismissing the affected nodes in a network’
or ‘disabling the ports of a computer which were
used during the attack’.
Thereby, all these three components constitute a whole
security structure and cannot be considered separately in
defending WSNs and IoT against diverse kinds of attacks.
In the literature, various surveys are provided to present
security issues in WSNs: Butun et al. [2] provided a survey
of intrusion detection systems, Zhu et al. [10] provided a
survey of detecting node replication attacks, Chen and Chao
[11] provided a survey of key distribution, Han et al. [12]
provided a survey of trust management. Finogeev et al.
[13] provided a survey on attacks and security in WSNs
of industrial SCADA systems. Following publications pro-
vided limited surveys of security issues and attacks against
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WSNs (and IoT) and their classifications: Padmavathi and
Shanmugapriya [14], Pathan et al. [15], Shabana et al. [16],
Bartariya and Rastogi [17], Sharma and Ghose [18], and
Borgohain et al. [19]. However, according to the best of
our knowledge, the survey provided in this paper is the
most comprehensive and the detailed one covering all the
attacks towards WSNs along with their related detection,
prevention, and mitigation techniques. Besides, our paper
also provides a path to defend IoT, by considering the
lessons learned while securing WSNs.
Security analysis of sub-domains of IoT, such as LPWAN
networks, is omitted in this manuscript. E.g., readers that
are interested in the security of LoRaWAN can refer to
following works: Butun et al. [20], [21], Eldefrawy et al. [22],
Haxhibeqiri et al. [23], and Sinha et al. [24]. Privacy and trust
related issues of IoT are also omitted in this text, in order
to keep the focus on “attacks and mitigation”. Readers that
are interested in that specific topic may refer to following
works: Butun [25], Chen et al. [26], Ott et al. [27], Sicari et al.
[28], and Yan et al. [29].
Security of the IoT is a very wide (attacks and their
counter-measures, privacy, trust, key-distribution, patch-
management, access-control, etc.) and also an emerging
topic. Hence, the aim of this survey is to present all cyber-
security attacks against WSNs and IoT along with their
related defense mechanisms. We believe that this would
shed light on researchers who are considering to devise
security algorithms for IoT. For this sake, we also provide a
section discussing the state-of-art networking technologies
in IoT. However, additional reading is advised as follows:
Shelby et al. [30] and Hartke [31] for CoAP, Banks et al. [32]
and Yokotani et al. [33] for MQTT, Brandt et al. [34] and
Zhang et al. [35] for RPL, Nikshepa et al. [36] and Fabre et
al. [37] for 6LoWPAN, Dujovne et al. [38] and Watteyne et al.
[39] for 6TiSCH, and finally Chang et al. [40] and Watteyne
et al. [41] for TSCH.
In this survey, prevention, detection, and mitigation of
attacks towards WSNs and IoT is the topic of interest. There-
fore, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1
briefly overviews the definition of IoT along with trends, im-
pact and future projections. Section 2 presents various types
of attacks towards the WSNs and IoT. Section 3 provides the
defense strategies including prevention, detection, and mit-
igation, against those attacks mentioned in Section 2. Cyber-
security of IoT including open challenges, cyber-attacks, and
defense mechanisms are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
presents unique security solutions in the field, discusses
the inclusion of security during WSN-IoT integration, and
presents final remarks. Section 6 concludes the paper. List of
abbreviations is presented in the Appendix section.
1.1 Internet of Things: Definition, Trends, Impact, and
Future Projections
The term ”Internet of things” was coined by Kevin Ashton
of Procter & Gamble, later MIT’s Auto-ID Center, in 1999.
Since then, the Internet of Things (IoT) has rapidly evolved
into a field that involves the interconnection and interac-
tion of smart objects, which are objects or devices with
embedded sensors, on-board data processing capability, and
a means of communication, to provide automated services
Fig. 2. IoT is the Confluence of Several Technologies.
and applications [4], [42], [43]. Rather than a single tech-
nology, IoT involves the convergence of WSNs, real-time
computing, embedded systems, and actuation technologies
[44], as shown in Fig. 2.
Today, most of what we consider as IoT is a variety
of largely stand-alone devices and isolated systems, such
as wearable fitness monitors [45], smart watches, smart
phones, home thermostats and lighting [46], and remote
video streaming [47]. Emerging IoT implementations will
use smaller and more energy- efficient embedded sensor
technologies, enhanced communications, advanced data an-
alytics, and more sophisticated actuators to collect and
aggregate information and enable intelligent systems that
understand context, track and manage complex interactions,
and anticipate requirements [48], [49], [50], [51], [52].
IoT is expected to become ubiquitous, with implemen-
tations in the smart home for management of energy use,
control of appliances, monitoring of food and other con-
sumables [46], [47], [53], [54]; consumer applications such
as health and fitness monitoring, condition diagnosis [45];
manufacturing and industrial settings for supply chain
management, robotic manufacturing, quality control, health
and safety compliance [42]; utility grids and other critical in-
frastructure for grid optimization, automated fault diagno-
sis, automated cyber security monitoring and response [53];
and automotive/transportation for optimization for driv-
ing conditions, assessing driver alertness, collision/accident
avoidance, and managing vehicle health [55], [56].
IoT is a networking infrastructure for Cyber-physical
systems (CPS) [42], which are engineered systems that are
built from, and depend upon, the seamless integration
of computation and physical components [44]. Advances
in CPS will enable capability, adaptability, scalability, re-
siliency, safety, security, and usability. CPS technologies are
transforming the way people interact with engineered sys-
tems, just as the Internet has transformed the way people in-
teract with information. CPS have been applied successfully
in a range of application domains including agriculture,
aeronautics, building design, civil infrastructure, energy, en-
vironmental quality, healthcare and personalized medicine,
manufacturing, and transportation [44].
Innovations in IoT potentially impact a variety of appli-
cations and services, such as connected cities and homes,
smart transportation, smart agriculture, industrial IoT, and
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Fig. 3. Security attacks towards the WSNs and IoT - OSI stack protocol layered description.
retail IoT. IoT enabled smart and connected communities
will bring about new levels of economic opportunity and
growth, safety and security, health and wellness, and overall
quality of life [54]. IoT enabled smart transportation will
provide improved safety, mobility, and energy conservation
in the development and operation of the highway system
[55]. Smart agriculture will deliver food, fiber, fuel, and feed
within a changing global climate while reducing agricul-
ture’s environmental footprint and managing biotic threats
to production [44]. Industrial IoT will enable an increasingly
wide range of value-added manufacturing services by being
intelligent, precise, predictable, reliable, secure, and adept
with fabricating new materials; connected and broadly ac-
cessible, with capabilities that are transparent to users;
connected to applications that reside in the cloud and plug
into an expansible, interactive architecture; accessible at low
cost to innovators and entrepreneurs, including both users
and providers of manufacturing services; clean, green, and
resource-efficient; and resilient to disruptions [42]. Retail
IoT will increase business efficiency, drive more sales and
improve customer satisfaction [54].
2 ATTACKS TOWARDS THE WSNS AND IOT
In the literature, there is a variety of classifications for
attacks towards the WSNs [14], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61],
[62], [63]. Among these, we will consider the activity of the
attacker (passive/active) as main categorization and the tar-
geted Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (layered
description of stack protocol) as sub-classifications as shown
in Fig. 3. Following subsections include descriptions of each
item in the Fig. 3:
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2.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks are performed in a way that it cannot be
sensed by any means. This is because of the fact that the
adversaries do not make any radio emissions. Since wireless
links are easier to tap, wireless networks are more suscepti-
ble to passive attacks, such as eavesdropping, which can be
performed easily listening to the wireless communication
amongst sensor nodes in the WSN without capturing any of
them. Passive attacks are mainly against data confidentiality.
In passive attacks, attackers are typically camouflaged,
i.e. hidden, and tap the communication lines to collect data.
Passive attacks can be grouped into eavesdropping, node
malfunctioning, node tampering/destruction, node outage
and traffic analysis types (see Fig. 3) [1].
Here, it is important to state that node malfunctioning,
node outage and node tampering are considered as active
attacks in some papers [14], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62],
[63]. We present them as passive attacks in this paper, hence
they do not introduce big concern (they do not constitute
a single point of failure, as the network can continue its
operation without the contribution of the failed nodes!)
to the network compared to other more impactive active
attacks.
2.1.1 Passive Information Gathering (Eavesdropping)
Eavesdropping is also known as “Passive information gath-
ering”. Classified data can be eavesdropped by tapping
communication lines. Hence wireless links are easier to tap,
wireless networks are more susceptible to passive attacks.
Since WSNs use short-range communications, an attacker
must be in proximity in order to gather useful information
by eavesdropping. WSNs are a little more secure against
tapping compared to other long-range wireless technologies
because signals are sent over shorter distances. Interception
of the messages transmitted through WSNs might reveal
following useful information: physical location of specific
nodes such as cluster heads, gateways, key distribution
centers, etc.; message identities (IDs), timestamps, other
fields, almost anything that is not encrypted.
2.1.2 Node Destruction
Physical destruction (with the usage of electrical surge,
physical force or ammunition) of the nodes by any means.
2.1.3 Node Malfunctioning
This may happen due to many different factors from faulty
sensors or energy depletion due to sensor overwhelming or
other DoS attacks.
2.1.4 Node Outage
This attack occurs whenever a node fails its regular func-
tionality. For example, if a cluster head of a heterogeneous
network fails at regular operation, then the WSN protocols
have to be strong enough to mitigate the negative effects
of this kind of node outages, by electing new cluster heads
and/or providing alternate routes for network paths.
2.1.5 Traffic Analysis
The traffic pattern of a network may be as valuable as the
content of data packets for adversaries. Important infor-
mation about the networking topology can be derived by
analyzing traffic patterns. In WSNs, the nodes closer to the
base station, i.e. the sink, make more transmissions than
the other nodes because they relay more packets than the
nodes farther from the base station. Similarly, clustering is
an important tool for scalability in WSNs and cluster heads
are busier than the other nodes in the network. Detection
of the base station, the nodes close to it or cluster heads
may be very useful for adversaries because a denial-of-
service attack against these nodes or eavesdropping the
packets destined for them may have a greater impact. By
analyzing the traffic, this kind of valuable information can
be derived. Moreover, traffic patterns can pertain to other
confidential information such as actions and intentions. In
tactical communications, silence may indicate preparation
for an attack, a tactical move or infiltration. Similarly, a
sudden increase in the traffic rate may indicate the start of a
deliberate attack or raid.
2.2 Active Attacks
In the active attacks, malicious acts are carried out not
only against data confidentiality but also data integrity.
Active attacks can also aim for unauthorized access and
usage of the resources or the disturbance of an opponent’s
communications. An active attacker makes a radio emission
or action that can be sensed by the WSN elements [61]. An
example is DoS attack in the physical and/or network layer
that would cause network elements to drop data packets.
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack mainly targets the avail-
ability of network services. A DoS is generally explained as
any kind of situation that consumes resources and dimin-
ishes the capacity of a network, therefore diverts the net-
work from performing its expected functionality correctly
or in a timely manner. A node is isolated from the rest of the
network by blocking the incoming and outgoing packets. In
DoS attack, an adversary attempts to prevent legitimate and
authorized users of services offered by the network from
accessing those services. The classic way to achieve this is to
flood packets to any centralized resource (access point) used
in the network so that the resource is no longer available to
the nodes in the network, resulting in the network no longer
operating what was designed for. This may lead to a failure
in the delivery of guaranteed services to the end users.
In the active attacks, an adversary actually affects the
operations of the attacked network. This effect may be the
objective of the attack and can be detected. For example,
the networking services may be degraded or terminated
as a result of these attacks. Sometimes the adversary tries
to stay undetected, aiming to gain unauthorized access to
the system resources or threatening confidentiality and/or
integrity of the content of the network. Active attacks of our
interest (for WSNs) are grouped into five main groups, by
following the OSI stack protocol layered structure, as shown
in Fig. 3.
The OSI network structure consists of 5 layers for WSNs
(and IoT) as described in [5]: Physical, Data-Link (MAC),
Network, Transport, and Application. It should be noted
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that Session and Presentation layers of the traditional OSI
network model are all considered in the Application layer
of WSNs (and IoT).
2.2.1 Attacks towards Physical Layer
2.2.1.1 Jamming DoS: It is a DoS attack at the
physical layer [62]. A malicious device can jam a signal by
transmitting at the same frequency. The jamming signal con-
tributes to the noise in the carrier and its strength is enough
to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio below the level that the
nodes using that channel need to receive data correctly.
Jamming can be conducted continuously in a region, which
thwarts all the nodes in that region from communication.
Alternatively, jamming can be done temporarily with ran-
dom time intervals, which can still very effectively hamper
the transmissions.
2.2.1.2 Node Capture (Tampering): An adversary
takes over the control of the sensor node by a physical
attack, e.g. attaching cables to its circuit board and reading
stored data as well as ongoing transmission in the WSN [1].
Besides, by tampering adversaries can change the original
wiring of the electronic board or change the content of
the memory of the nodes and use the captured slave node
by any means. Capturing a node might expose its critical
data, especially revealing of cryptography-related keys and
therefore might cause compromisation of the whole WSN.
Two problems arise in this case:
• Captured node can make arbitrary queries on behalf
of the attacker (DoS attack against availability).
• Captured node can provide false data to the legiti-
mate users (attack against integrity).
2.2.2 Attacks towards Data Link Layer
The algorithms in the data link layer, especially MAC
schemes, present many exploitation opportunities for DoS
attacks. For example, MAC layer DoS attacks may continu-
ously jam a channel. More complex DoS attacks can be de-
signed based on MAC layer addressing schemes. Data link
layer attacks are categorized as follows: Collision, denial of
sleep, de-synchronization, exhaustion, flooding, link layer
jamming, spoofing, and unfairness.
2.2.2.1 Collision: In collision attack, an adversary
starts transmitting packets from the same channel of a
legitimate node of the network, whenever the legitimate
one starts transmission. Hence, as a result, both transmitted
packets collide and the targeted receiver does not receive
the whole meaningful packet from the transmitter due to
the collision loss in the transmission. Hence it is useless, the
received packet is discarded and the transmitter is asked
for re-transmission of the packet [19]. Causing collusions
of a single byte of a message would be sufficient to cause
a CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) error and eventually
corrupt the whole message. From the attacker point of
view, the collision attack is more advantageous compared
to the jamming attack, since consumed transmission energy
is lower (because the radio is used just only for a short
duration of time) as well as the probability of detection [63].
2.2.2.2 Denial of Sleep (Sleep Deprivation Torture):
Preventing a node from going to sleep leading to energy de-
pletion from draining the battery. This can be from collision
attacks or repeated handshaking i.e. Request to Send (RTS)
and Clear to Send (CTS) flow control signals. In this attack, a
node is forced to deplete whole energy stored in its batteries
[64].
2.2.2.3 De-synchronization: Time Synchronized
Channel Hopping (TSCH) is a MAC layer protocol
presented in IEEE 802.15.4e standard. It empowers extreme
consistency and possesses small duty cycles through the
time synchronization and channel hopping techniques. [65]
Attacks against the TSCH time synchronization can happen
when an attacker transmits the messages in the time-slots
that are alloted to the other users. This causes the packets
to collide and to be lost. After carefully observing the
back-off times an attacker can cause a series of these events
which eventually would cause the neighboring motes to be
de-synchronized. Hence, this attack can be taught of as an
advanced version of collusion attack.
2.2.2.4 Exhaustion: If the collusion attack described
above, continues until the targeted node depletes its energy,
this is called exhaustion attack [63]. This kind of attack can be
executed by using an ordinary node or a laptop, which have
the ability to transmit radio signals in the same band as the
rest of the sensors do.
2.2.2.5 Link Layer Flooding: In this type of attack,
a malicious node abuses the fairness of medium access
by sending excessive MAC data packets or MAC control
packets to its neighboring nodes. In the end, victim nodes
suffer from DoS or the power of their batteries get ex-
hausted. Additionally, this attack may also exhaust channel
bandwidth resources. [66]
2.2.2.6 Link Layer Jamming: In this type of attack,
the most useful packets, i.e. data packets, are targeted to be
jammed. The probability distribution of the packet arrival
times is acquired and used against the packets transmission.
This attack is shown to be successful against these MAC
protocols: B-MAC, L-MAC, and S-MAC [63].
2.2.2.7 Spoofing/ ARP-Spoofing: In the spoofing
attack, a malicious node spoofs MAC address of another
victim node and then creates a number of various legitimate
identities out of the victim node and uses these identi-
ties anywhere else in the network [16]. Whereas in ARP-
spoofing attack, an attacker sends spoofed ARP (Address
Resolution Protocol) messages into the network. Generally,
the aim is to associate the attacker’s MAC address with
the IP address of a higher ranked node such as the default
gateway, causing any traffic meant for that IP address to be
sent to the attacker instead.
2.2.2.8 Unfairness: Sporadic usage of exhaustion at-
tack or mis-usage of cooperative MAC protocols can cause
unfairness in the network [57]. Unlike a DoS attack, this
attack does not cause a user or a node completely to be
disconnected from the network, but it causes intermittent
blackouts in which users send/receive delayed messages.
This attack degrades the quality of service in the network,
hence it provides an advantage to the least number of the
sensor nodes and disadvantage to the rest of the network,
as the rest of the nodes miss their transmission deadlines in
real-time MAC protocol configuration.
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2.2.3 Attacks towards Network Layer
In the case of network layer attacks, an attacker injects a
significant amount of packets into the network which causes
congestion in the network traffic as well as deprivation of
power resources throughout the network. Example: “Rout-
ing table overflow attack: Creation of the routes to the
non-existing nodes” [67]. Network layer attacks are catego-
rized as HELLO flooding, hole attacks (blackhole, sinkhole,
wormhole), node replication, routing, selective forwarding,
and Sybil types.
2.2.3.1 HELLO-flooding: In this kind of attack, an
attacker (has longer transmission range than normal nodes)
broadcasts advertisement messages to the whole network
and convinces other nodes that it is located in their neigh-
borhood.
In a more technical description; routing protocols broad-
cast “HELLO” message to inform of their presence to one-
hop neighbors. A node receiving such a packet assumes
that it is within the radio range of the sender which may
not be true during this attack. A malicious node may flood
“HELLO” packets with high enough transmission power to
convince every node in the network that it is their neighbor.
When the other nodes send their packets to the malicious
node, those packets are not received by any node.
Many network and MAC layer protocols ask nodes to
broadcast “HELLO” packet for announcing their presence
towards their neighbors. Any node, receiving such a packet
might consider that it is enclosed in the normal radio-
range of the packet sender. This assumption would be
falsified in some specific cases as follows: A laptop-class at-
tacker broadcasting routing or other information with large
enough transmission power could convince every node in
the network that the adversary is its neighbor.
“Flooding” is usually used to denote the epidemic-like
propagation of a message to every node in the network
over a multi-hop topology. In contrast, despite its name, the
HELLO flood attack uses a single hop broadcast to transmit
a message to a large number of receivers [59].
2.2.3.2 Hole Attacks:
• Blackhole: A malicious node may drop all the pack-
ets that it receives for forwarding. This attack is
especially effective when the blackhole node is also
a sinkhole. Such an attack combination may stop all
the data traffic around the blackhole. In some texts,
this attack is also referred as “Selfishness”.
• Sinkhole: A malicious node can advertise by broad-
casting to all the neighbor nodes that it is the best
next hop for sending the packets to its destination.
When a node becomes a sinkhole, it becomes the
hub for its vicinity and starts receiving all the packets
going to the base station. All traffic of the network is
directed to this single node but in this case, sinkhole
node does not drop any packets. By this way, it
expects to remain undetected by the IDS. This cre-
ates many opportunities for any follow-on attacks.
Since all traffic of the network passes through this
particular node which literally “sinks” all the data it
receives, the name is given to this attack.
• Selective Forwarding (Grayhole): It is a special kind
of blackhole attack, in which malicious node acts
more cleverly and does not drop every packet it
receives but the ones it selects. By this way, attacker
expects to remain undetected by the IDS. This type
of attack is also called “grayhole attack” as it is a
variant of blackhole attack.
Similar to sinkhole attacks, a malicious node sub-
verts the routing protocol by making itself part of
many routes but instead of dropping of all packets
selectively drop some packets while forwarding oth-
ers in order to avoid detection. Forwarding packets
is a major responsibility of a routing node. However,
a malicious node intentionally may drop any packet
and forward other ones.
Multi hopped networks are generally built upon the
following assumption: The participant sensor nodes
would be faithful in forwarding the messages they
receive. In a selective-forwarding attack, adversary
nodes might reject forwarding some certain mes-
sages by simply dropping them and making sure
that these packets are not distributed anymore. As
an example of this kind of attack, a malicious node
behaves like a blackhole and refuses to forward every
packet it receives. However, such an attacker has the
following risk: Neighboring nodes will conclude that
it has failed and they may decide to seek another
route. A more subtle form of this attack is when an
adversary selectively forwards packets. An adver-
sary interested in suppressing or modifying pack-
ets originating from a select few nodes can reliably
forward the remaining traffic and limit suspicion of
his/her wrongdoing.
• Wormhole: A tunnel (out of the band fast transmis-
sion path) is created between two nodes that can be
utilized to transmit packets in a faster way. This way,
two far parts of the network advertised as neighbors
to attract the surrounding traffic [68].
A malicious node can eavesdrop or receive data
packets at a point and transfer them to another
malicious node, which is at another part of the net-
work, through an out-of-band channel. The second
malicious node then replays the packets. This makes
all the nodes that can hear the transmissions by
the second malicious node believe that the node
that sent the packets to the first malicious node is
their single-hop neighbor and they are receiving the
packets directly from it. The packets that follow the
normal route reach destination node, later than those
conveyed through the wormhole and are therefore
dropped because they do more hops - wormholes
are typically established through faster channels.
Wormholes are very difficult to detect and can
impact on the performance of many network services
such as time synchronization, localization, and data
fusion.
2.2.3.3 Node-Replication (Clone): An attacker in-
tentionally puts replicas of a compromised node in many
places in the network to incur inconsistency. Node-
replication (clone) attack is one of the particularly most
dreadful attacks hence it causes an attacker to be able to
divert the behavior of a network by just using a few copies
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of a previously hacked nodes [69]. Like the Sybil attack, the
node-replication (clone) attack also can enable attackers to
subvert data aggregation, misbehavior detection, and voting
protocols by injecting false data or suppressing legitimate
data [70].
2.2.3.4 Routing Attacks:
• Misdirection: In misdirection attack, an attacker for-
wards ongoing messages to the wrong paths inten-
tionally. This can be achieved by fabricating false
routing advertisements and causing routing tables of
the neighboring nodes’ to update these false informa-
tion [57]. This attack is also categorized as DoS attack,
hence targeted nodes are blacked out completely
and do not receive any further packets after the
advertisement of the false routing information.
• Network Partitioning: A fully connected network
is portioned to sub-networks in which the nodes
in different sub-networks cannot communicate each
other although they are connected.
• Routing Loop: A routing loop is introduced in a
route path. It is created by spoofing routing updates.
Suppose an adversary can determine that node A
and node B are within radio range of each other. An
adversary can send a forged routing update to node
B with a spoofed source address indicating it came
from node A. Node B will then mark node A as its
parent and rebroadcast the routing update. Node A
will then hear the routing update from node B and
mark B as its parent. Messages sent to either A or B
will be forever forwarded in a loop between the two
of them. This leads to energy depletion and eventual
node/network failure [59].
• Rushing: When this attack is performed against “on-
demand ad hoc network routing protocols”, it results
in DoS in the network. For instance; AODV, DSR,
and more secure protocols based on these, i.e. ARAN,
SAODV, and Ariadne, are not capable of discovering
routes that are longer than two-hops when they are
subjected to this kind of attack. The rushing attack
is especially harmful to networks hence it can be
executed by relatively weak adversaries [71].
• Spoofed, Altered or Replayed Routing Information:
Routing information exchanged among nodes can
be altered by malicious nodes to have a detrimental
effect on the routing scheme.
2.2.3.5 RPL Exploit: IoT consist of devices that are
limited in resource like battery powered, memory, process-
ing capability, etc. For this kind o networks, a new network
layer routing protocol is designed called RPL (Routing Pro-
tocol for Low-power and lossy networks) [72]. RPL is light
weight and does not have the full functionality of traditional
routing protocols. RPL was proposed especially for data-
sinks (multi-point to point communications) and is being
adopted by IoT recently. Many attacks against the RPL of
IoT have been presented in [73].
As discussed and proposed in our paper, IoT is also
susceptible to most of the attacks against WSNs. The attacks
presented in [73] and [74] support this idea in a sense that
other than a few attacks (which are specifically against RPL
protocol), all of the attacks are same as the “Attacks against
Routing Layer” presented in this section. These specific
attacks against RPL protocol are: Local-Repair attack, Rank
attack , DODAG version attack, DIS attack, and finally
Neighbor attack. [73]
In local repair attack, an attacker intentionally and peri-
odically sends the local repair message which is originally
used for improvement of the link quality. This causes the
neighboring nodes to go into local repair cycle. This attack
creates more impact on delivery ratio than any other kind
of attack, generates more control packets and increases the
end to end delay [73].
DODAG stands for Destination Oriented Directed
Acyclic Graph, which is created by RPL by forming a loop-
free topology. DODAG organizes nodes in a hierarchical
manner as single root, children and their further descen-
dants [75].
In RPL, rank value increases from root to child node. In
RPL DODAG rank attack, an attacker can exploit DODAG
version system by advancing its rank in the hierarchical
tree and gaining many children which are forced to route
packets through the attacker parent. So, by intentionally
changing the ranking value of itself, an attacker can attract
many child nodes for selecting it as parent, and thereby at-
tracts large traffic going toward the root node (main branch)
to flow through itself.
Another exploit of RPL DODAG version system is called
DODAG version attack. It is executed by publishing a
higher version number of the DODAG tree. When nodes
receive the new higher version number in the DODAG
Information Object (DIO) messages, they start forming a
new DODAG tree. This can cause the generation of new
un-optimized topology and will bring inconsistencies in
the network topology. The loops and rank inconsistencies
created by the attack are generally located around the neigh-
borhood of the attacker. [73]
In DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) attack, an at-
tacker sends DIS messages with fake IP addresses which
causes the recipient node to re-generate the DIO messages,
which eventually increases the overhead.
In RPL neighbor attack, a malicious node broadcast DIO
messages that it received without adding information of
itself. The node which receives this type of message may
think that new neighbor node is sending this DIO message.
The victim node tries to change the routing tables so that
the pointed node is also included. This attack is somehow
similar to the selective forwarding attack in which DIO mes-
sages selected only. This attack affects network by slightly
increases the end to end delay, change in network topology,
and some control overhead. However, it might have serious
consequences when combined with other attacks.
2.2.3.6 6LoWPAN Exploit: 6LoWPAN is an Internet
protocol devised for the IoT for the sake of extended us-
age of IPv6 by the smart-things. 6LoWPAN integrates IP-
based infrastructures and WSNs by specifying how IPv6
packets are to be routed in constrained networks such as
IEEE 802.15.4 networks by fragmentation and reassembly of
datagram data fields.
A specific attack for 6LoWPAN is fragment duplication
attack, in which an attacker puts his own fragments in the
fragmentation chain. The fragment duplication attack takes
the advantage of the fact that a recipient cannot verify at
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the 6LoWPAN layer if a fragment originates from the same
source as previously received fragments of the same IPv6
packet. Hence no authentication mechanism exists on the re-
ceiver at the time of reception for checking whether received
fragment is an original or spoofed duplicate fragment, this
attack can easily fool the receiver. The receiver cannot
distinguish legitimate fragments from spoofed duplicates.
Instead, it has to process all fragments that appear to belong
to the same IPv6 packet according to the sender’s MAC
address and the 6LoWPAN datagram tag. Thus, an attacker
can pretend as a legitimate node and exploit this weakness
to engage in further attacks such as a DoS attack. [73], [76].
2.2.3.7 Sybil Attack: A single node presents multi-
ple identities to other nodes of the network. This causes con-
fusion in the network; nodes receive contradicting routing
paths that are passing through the attacker. This reduces
the effectiveness of fault-tolerance schemes and poses a
significant threat to geographic routing protocols [77]. Apart
from these services it may also affect the performance of
other schemes such as misbehavior detection, voting-based
algorithms, data aggregation, fusion and distributed storage
[?].
2.2.4 Attacks towards Transport Layer
The transport layer of the OSI protocol stack manages
end-to-end connections of the two nodes. At the transport
layer, attacks exploit the protocols that maintain connection
information at either end. [60] All transport layer attacks are
categorized and described as follows:
2.2.4.1 De-Synchronization: An attacker disrupts
actual links among two nodes by de-synchronizing the
transmissions in between them. An example of this type of
attack is sending fabricated messages, such as faulty flag
kind of sequences, (by transmitting forged packets with
bogus sequence numbers or control flags that desynchro-
nize endpoints so that they will re-transmit the data [60])
continuously to both sides of the communicating parties, as
a result, to force them losing their synchronization [57], [63].
2.2.4.2 MQTT Exploit: The Message Queue Teleme-
try Transport (MQTT) [78] is a lightweight publish-and-
subscribe connectivity protocol aimed at working on
resource-constrained devices such as low power embedded
sensors to enable them communicating. In the IoT con-
text, MQTT is widely used to enable the communication
between devices using a publish-and-subscribe messaging
approach. However, MQTT does not include security layer
by default and it is the user’s responsibility to address
security issues. In this direction, it is suggested to enable
security for MQTT by issuing SSL/TLS with certificates and
session key management. That is being said, owing to the
multitude of heterogeneous devices, storing and managing
the certificates and key exchanges for every session of IoT is
burdensome. Furthermore, SSL/TLS can suffer from attacks
such as BEAST, CRIME, RC4, and Heartbleed. Thus a scal-
able, lightweight and robust security mechanism is required
for MQTT and its variants for deployment in IoT. [79]
2.2.4.3 Session Hijacking: In computer science, this
attack is referred as the “exploitation of” and “tampering
with” a valid communication session (which is also called as
session key) to gain unauthorized access on information or
services of a system. As being an extension of IP networks,
session hijacking of TCP messages will also be affecting and
troublesome for IoT networks.
2.2.4.4 SYN-flooding: In a flooding attack, an at-
tacker aims at exhausting the energy and/or the memory
of a node, by flooding it with spurious messages. This
is achieved, for instance, by sending multiple connection
requests without ever completing the connection, thus over-
whelming the buffer and eventually causing the node to be
dead [57], [63].
More specifically, in a TCP SYN (synchronize) flood-
ing attack, an adversary sends multiple TCP connection
requests without ever completing the connection, thus over-
whelming the target’s half-open connection buffer. [60]
2.2.5 Attacks towards Application Layer
Application layer protocols can also be exploited by DoS at-
tacks. Protocols like node localization, time synchronization,
data aggregation, association, and fusion can be cheated or
hindered. For example, a malicious node that impersonates
a beacon node and gives false location information or cheats
with regard to its transmission power, i.e. transmitting with
less or more power than it is supposed to do, may hamper
the node localization scheme. Since this kind of attack
diminishes the related network service, they can also be
categorized as DoS attacks. An example of application layer
DoS attack is path-based DoS attack and will be described
below. All application layer attacks are categorized and
described as follows:
2.2.5.1 CoAP Exploit: Constrained Application Pro-
tocol (CoAP) [80] is an application layer protocol designed
as a replication of the HTTP for the small devices of IoT to
provide communication ability with the rest of the Internet.
Recently, many implementations of IoT are using CoAP,
which indicates that it will have a crucial role in the future
of IoT applications.
As mentioned in [81], there are several challenges related
to security by the introduction of CoAP. It does not translate
full functionality of HTTP, which creates security problems
for multicast messages.
2.2.5.2 False Data Injection: In order to influence the
overall result of a measurement or a reading, captured nodes
intentionally inject false data in the WSN. Therefore, it can
be stated that this attack happens in a semantic level, hence
it does not affect anything but the logic.
2.2.5.3 Path-based DoS: As the name implies, this
attack is a DoS attack that happens in the application layer.
In this attack; an attacker overwhelms nodes but this time
from long distance by again flooding an end-to-end com-
munications path with either fabricated packets or replayed
packets [82]. So, as a result, all the nodes along the path,
from the source to destination (attacker to the base station)
are affected by this attack.
2.2.5.4 Re-programming: Once in a while, ev-
ery network element either needs to be patched or
re-programmed for version control, code acquisition,
encoding-decoding, or when switching to a newly written
program. That’s also true for WSNs and IoT. If this re-
programming (or patch management per say) schedule is
not kept secret, then adversaries can take advantage of this
vulnerable time of the network by simply sending bogus
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messages to the nodes and pushing them into unstable or
dead state [83].
2.2.5.5 Sensor Overwhelming: Attacking or altering
the sensitivity of the sensor measurements. Targeting sen-
sors with spurious interference or completely overwhelm-
ing them with fake messages and inundating them with
false stimuli.
3 DEFENDING AGAINST VARIOUS ATTACKS TO-
WARDS THE WSNS AND IOT
Routing protocols can be designed such that an adversary
cannot compromise nodes/messages or make the routing
scheme dysfunction. This is the most effective approach
with respect to the cost of the security scheme and effec-
tiveness in defense of WSNs against the threats. Therefore,
most of the techniques fall into this category.
Preventive approaches are designed to counter known
threats and may not be effective against new threats. De-
tection schemes for misbehaving or malfunctioning nodes
can be designed in a more generic fashion. On the other
hand, they can be more costly than preventive approaches.
Finally, routing can be designed such that it still delivers the
data packets to the destination when there is an attack. Such
resilient techniques are also costly.
Following subsections provide solutions (strategies and
techniques) to defend (detect, prevent or mitigate) against
various attacks towards the WSNs on all of the layers of the
OSI protocol stack:
3.1 Defense against Passive Attacks
3.1.1 Defense against Passive Information Gathering
The communications in WSNs are achieved through the
air, and therefore we do not know whether the packets
arrive the intended people only or not. Hence detection of
eavesdropping is almost impossible.
Link layer encryption would prevent outsider attacks
such as eavesdropping, and some of the solutions are pro-
vided in [59], [84], [85], [86], [87]. The bulk of the external
attacks towards WSNs can be avoided by link-layer en-
cryption and authentication by using globally-shared keys.
For example, to provide link layer encryption, Karlof et al.
[88] proposed TinySec for WSNs. SNEP (Secure Network
Encryption Protocol) under the SPINS [84] protocol set, is
also one another famous encryption protocol that is devised
for WSNs.
In [89], authors proposed SensorWare communication
multicast model in which 3 different levels of link-layer
encryption are provided by using the RC6 algorithm. They
have chosen the RC6 algorithm, because its selection of
the number of rounds parameter, has a direct effect on the
security level of the algorithm. An initial set of master keys
are shared by all sensors in the network. At any time, one of
the master keys in the list of the master keys is active. The
reason is, in order to expose less data for known-ciphertext
attacks, more keys will be necessary as the lifetime of the
network extends. This selection of the keys is executed
pseudo-random way, every node uses the same seed for
randomizing function. Then, the random number is coupled
to the list of the master keys to obtain the active master key.
TABLE 1
Solutions to defend WSNs against DoS attacks
DoS attack Defense strategy
Radio interference Usage of spread-spectrum communication
Physical tampering Usage of tamper-resistant nodes
Denying channel Usage of error correction codes
Blackhole Usage of multiple routing paths
Misdirection Usage of source authorization
Flooding Limiting the total number of connections
For the rest of the security model, the required keys for the
3 different levels of security are gathered from this active
master key.
Random key pre-distribution schemes [90], [91], [92]
help link layer encryption schemes by distributing the keys
needed by the encryption algorithms, hence they help WSNs
to protect information in transit and prevent eavesdropping,
data and information spoofing.
3.2 Defense against Active Attacks
In Table 1, some of the solutions [93] to defend WSNs
against various DoS attacks are summarized. However, this
presentation is too generic and that’s why we needed to
present Table 2 in an effort to give the whole picture with a
detailed categorization.
3.2.1 Defense on Physical Layer
In [94], authors propose a cross-layer security mechanism,
namely “Swarm Intelligence”, to detect Jamming-DoS at-
tacks. They also provide countermeasures to mitigate this
kind of attack. JAM − a jammed area mapping service
[95], is proposed for detecting jamming DoS attack against
WSNs. JAM provided a mapping protocol to detect a
jammed region in a WSN. Besides, in terms of mitigation,
JAM avoided the jammed part of the WSN by re-routing
the packets thus provided a remedy for the Jamming DoS
attack.
In [96], authors proposed wormhole technique, normally
known to be an attack against WSNs, which could be
effectively used to defer Jamming DoS attack against WSNs.
In order to defend WSN from node tampering attacks,
nodes might be equipped with tamper-resistant hardware,
in which any kind of tamper attempt would wipe out the
memory (and also any other data storage) so that confi-
dential information (such as the secret keys) would not be
leaked. Although this is a wise and excellent solution, it
comes with an additional cost of hardware which would
increase the total cost of the WSN installation and cripple
the most appealing feature of such networks: “low cost”.
Other ways of fighting against node tampering would be
disabling JTAG interface of the sensors and the use of good
password protection for the bootstrap loader of the sensor
boards [63]. Finally, a naı¨ve way of protecting the nodes
against this kind of attacks would be simply hiding the
nodes by camouflaging [18].
Detection of the tampering attempts would require rou-
tinely physical checking of the sensor nodes by eye or with
special equipment such as magnifiers. Though, this task
might be tedious considering the fact that sometimes nodes
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are deployed across dangerous and hard to reach places
such as flooded zones, nuclear leakage areas, etc.
3.2.2 Defense on Data Link Layer
3.2.2.1 Defense against Collusion and Exhaustion:
In order to defend WSNs against collusion and exhaustion
attacks, request rate of each node might be limited to some
certain value (by decreasing the MAC admission control
rate), so that the network can discard extra requests from
the same node (attacker) [63]. Another solution would be the
employment of time division multiplexing (TDM) technique
which would provide dedicated time slots to each node to
transmit their packets. This would allow each node to have
a tiny period of time to access the channel. By this way, the
channel usage of each node is limited and attacks related
to channel abusing are prevented. If the corruption of the
packets occurs partially (in bursts), employment of error
detection and error correction codes would be beneficial
tools to fight against this kind of attacks [18].
3.2.2.2 Defense against Denial of Sleep and Link
Layer Flooding: Liu et al.’s anomaly detection-based IDS
proposal works on ad hoc networks and therefore fits
well to the WSNs and IoT. In their proposal, each node
participates to the detection of the abnormal nodes. Packet
traffic at MAC layer is analyzed and evaluated. Distributed
and cooperative anomaly detection is achieved by creating
feature vectors at each node and then fulfilling cross-feature
analyses. This is resulted with local or global response (ei-
ther response from single node or a collaborative response
from multiple nodes) according to the seriousness of the
attack situation. The proposed IDS has shown to be effective
against MAC layer attacks, especially on denial of sleep and
flooding attacks. [66]
3.2.2.3 Defense against De-synchronization: Many
applications require the IoT to have a low and deterministic
delay, especially for IIoT applications where delay tolerance
is low. Having a deterministic network delay in a WSN is
challenging in the best case when traditional MAC protocols
are employed. To enable low power, high reliability and
deterministic WSNs, IETF recently proposed 6TiSCH pro-
tocol that uses time slotted channel hopping (TSCH) MAC
with IPv6 addressing. This protocol dynamically assigns
bandwidth resources to the nodes in the network according
to the application requirements, hence it provides a commu-
nications stack for low power and lossy networks such as
IoT. The proposal includes secure communication of MAC
layer frames so that any kind of eavesdropping or packet
capturing would have no benefit of these. [97]
3.2.2.4 Defense against Unfairness: In [57], usage of
small frames is offered as a defense solution to this kind of
attack. By this way, an attacker would capture the channel
only for a small period of time and unfairness would be
avoided.
3.2.3 Defense on Network Layer
3.2.3.1 Defense against Blackhole: Liu et al.’s
anomaly detection-based IDS proposal works on each node
and have also shown to be effective (but less compared
to detecting attacks against MAC layer) on network layer,
especially for detection of blackhole and grayhole (packet-
dropping) attacks. [66]
In [98], authors proposed REWARD scheme, in order to
detect blackhole attacks against WSNs. Besides, this scheme
provides a routing algorithm, in which detected blackholes
are avoided hence the WSN resumes normal operation
under blackhole attack.
In [99], authors discussed the effects of network topology
selection in WSNs on blackhole attacks. Their findings sug-
gest that mesh topology is more resilient against blackhole
attacks compared to star and tree topologies.
In [100], Prathapani et al. proposed the use of Honeypots,
which are strolling software agents that create dummy
Route-Request (RREQ) packets to attract and catch black-
hole attack performers. Authors have illustrated the positive
performance of the proposed detection approach by exten-
sive simulation results using the ns-2 simulator.
Watchdog based intrusion detection system proposed in
[101], is efficient in detecting blackhole and selective for-
warding attacks. Sensor nodes in the clustered-WSN watch
their neighbors and collaborate with the head of the cluster
in order to be able to detect misbehavior. Although sensor
nodes do not have an exhaustive view of the network,
still they can be effective in detecting intrusions with some
definite probability and report it to the head of the cluster.
In [102], Medadian et al. presented a method to cope
with the blackhole attacks which introduces negotiating
with neighboring nodes that claim to possess a route to the
destination. If a node receives an RREP packet (correspond-
ing answer to an RREQ packet) then it forwards this packet
to the source and starts an evaluation procedure about the
replier. The evaluation procedure is based upon opinions of
the nodes about the replier. All activities of a node are saved
by its neighbors. Whenever the neighbors of a particular
node are asked to send their opinions about it, requester
node gathers all opinions of the neighbors and concludes
about the maliciousness of the replier node. The conclusion
is based on several rules. According to authors’ simulation
results, it has shown that the presented MAODV protocol
provided not only better security but also performed better
in terms of packet delivery ratio than the legacy AODV
protocol in the existence of blackholes with minimum added
delay and overhead.
In ActiveTrust [103], in order to detect blackhole attacks
in WSNs, authors have created multi-detection routes in the
areas which have remaining energy. Hence an adversary
does not know the detection routes, (s)he will target those
and while executing the action (s)he will be disclosed. By
this method, location and behavior of an adversary can be
determined by ActiveTrust to be used for avoiding black-
holes during the creation of the final data routes.
In [104], authors presented a technique for detecting
and preventing blackhole attacks in clustered-WSNs. In this
methodology, a node called coordinator is selected by all
nodes dependent on the cluster-head election criterion. Co-
ordinator node has the responsibility in the authentication
process, detection of intermediate node failures as well as
blackhole attacks. If a blackhole attacker is detected in the
cluster, then the coordinator removes it from the cluster,
hence all the communications with this specific node are
terminated.
Misra et al. [105] proposed a method called BAMBi,
which is based on the deployment of spatially diverse
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base stations in the WSN to cope with the consequences
of having blackholes on the data transmission. Presented
method demands transmission of extra copies of a packet
from each node to all base stations. To ensure that every
node has a route to it, each base station uses TinyOS
beaconing. The beacon packet from any BS consists of: the
ID of the sender of the packet, the ID of the base station
from which it originated, and the hop count of the sender
from the base station to the node. This beaconing process
creates a routing tree in the network and used for detection
and mitigation of blackhole attacks against the network.
According to their simulation results, authors have shown
that the proposed method has achieved over 99% success
rate in packet deliveries in the presence of blackhole attack.
In [106], Amouri et al. proposed a framework of intru-
sion detection for MANETs. The framework considered a
hierarchical architecture where the intrusion detection is
distributed through a set of promiscuous zones (PZ). Unlike
the traditional approach where the nodes are promiscuous
all the time, in their scheme the nodes are promiscuous for
the period that they are in the PZ. Once a node leaves
the virtual PZ its promiscuity is turned off in order to
save energy. Authors have used a C4.5 decision tree to
learn the network behavior under blackhole attack, and
after exhaustive evaluation, authors have shown that their
approach was able to recognize blackhole attacks with up to
97% accuracy.
3.2.3.2 Defense against HELLO Flooding: One pos-
sible solution to this problem is provided in [59]: Force
every node to authenticate each of its neighbors with an
identity verification protocol using a trusted base station.
If the protocol sends messages in both directions over the
link between the nodes, HELLO floods are prevented when
the adversary only has a powerful transmitter because the
protocol verifies the bi-directionality of the link.
In [107], authors presented a shared-secret method based
on probability to defend against HELLO flooding attack.
The proposed method has 2 steps in terms of defense: 1)
Bidirectional verification technique to detect HELLO floods.
2) “Multi-path multi-base station routing” in order to defer
HELLO floods.
µ-TESLA “(Micro Timed Efficient Streaming Loss-
tolerant Authentication) protocol”, under the SPINS [84]
protocol set, has been proposed to provide authenticated
broadcasting in an effort to prevent HELLO flooding attack;
and achieved this by employing symmetric key cryptogra-
phy which required minimum packet overhead.
3.2.3.3 Defense against Node-Replication (Clone):
In [108] and [109], authors proposed location based Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) algorithms in order to prevent
clone attacks. Every sensor node has a private key associ-
ated with the location of itself. These location-based keys
are employed to prevent node replications.
In detecting clone attacks, there are a variety of solutions
provided. More interested readers would refer to [10], hence
detailed comparisons of the schemes proposed to detect
node-replication attacks are provided in. Here, they are
summarized under 2 categories:
Centralized Solutions: Conventional methods to detect
a node replication attack usually include centralized com-
puting based on node locations or the number of simultane-
ous connections, which is vulnerable to the single-point fail-
ure [70]. Mostly, centralized detection schemes do not have
significant advantages over distributed detection schemes;
and bear similar deficiencies (such as any compromisation
at the base-station would transform the provided-solution
to an ineffective one).
Choi et al. [110] presented a scheme to detect centralized
node-replication attacks and named it as “SET”. SET aims at
reducing the overhead caused by the detection, with compu-
tation set of operations (“intersection”, “union”) related to
exclusive subsets of the WSN. Not only SET protocol is very
complicated to implement (owing to complex components
like interleaved authentication and authenticated subset
covering), but also has an increased overload.
Brooks et al. [111] presented a protocol to detect clone
attacks based on “random pairwise key pre-distribution
schemes”. Proposed scheme addressed the problem of de-
tecting replicated cryptographic keys instead of the repli-
cated sensor nodes. By analyzing statistical data from the
sensor node authentications, the proposed scheme detects
the replicated keys as follows: The keys that are exceeding
a predefined usage count (threshold) are declared as repli-
cated and revoked from the WSN.
Xing et al. [112] presented a method to detect node-
replication attacks with the encoded information related to
nodes’ community network called the “social fingerprint”.
In this method, nodes collaborate to create each other’s
fingerprints then send these data to the base station for fur-
ther conclusion process. However, in the proposed scheme,
the expected number of nodes is not adjustable; therefore
not only node addition but also node revocation cannot be
managed, causing the flexibility of the WSN to disappear.
Ho et al. [113] presented an efficient and fast node-
replication detection model for mobile WSNs called “speed
test”. In this model, the base-stations compute the instant
maximum speed of a node, and denote it as V max and then
compare it with the system configured maximum theoretical
speed V max− T . An authentic node should be never mov-
ing faster than V max− T . If the instant-measured V max is
to be found above the configured V max−T , then it is most
probable that there are at least two sensor nodes using the
same ID in the WSN, the indication of a replication attack.
Although the proposed scheme sounds very appealing,
it might introduce errors causing high false-negative and
false-positive outcomes due to the synchronization errors.
Butun et al. [114] proposed an IDS system for clustered-
WSNs based on multi-level clustering. In their approach, all
the member nodes of each cluster share secret keys with
their cluster head. Each node is specific to their unique
cluster and cannot be used in any other cluster elsewhere
in the network. Therefore, any attempt of node replication
attack is easily detected and prevented by using this kind of
clustered approach.
Distributed Solutions: In [70], Parno et al. presented a
method for distributed detection of the clone attacks. On
this approach, each sensor node is considered to know its
own location, and it is mandatory to send this location
information to a set of watchdog sensors. If a watchdog
sensor detects an abuse in the location declarations of a
sensor node, this node then becomes as suspicious of having
a replicated (once or more) identity in the network. In
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order to cope with this problem and to certify the authentic
location claims of the nodes, public-key cryptography is
employed.
Another distributed detection method of clone attacks
is devised by Conti et al. [69]. In their proposal, “HIP-HOP
(History Information-exchange Protocol and its optimized
version)” protocol is devised. Proposed protocols make use
of local neighborhood (one-hop) communications and mo-
bility of nodes, and can be considered as light-weight for the
amount of computation required. While detecting clones,
the proposed protocols work in an effective, distributed and
cooperative way.
In node-to-network broadcasting (N2NB) scheme
[70], the whole network is flooded by every node with
authenticated-broadcast messages. This is in an effort of
each node by claiming its own location. In the pre-condition
that the broadcast messages reach each node, the N2NB
protocol is reported to achieve 100% detection rate.
In deterministic multicast (DM) scheme [70], the aim
of the design is to reduce the communications cost, and the
main goal is sending location claim of a node only towards
a certain number of nodes, chosen in a deterministic way, to
serve as watchdogs in the network.
“Randomized multicast (RM)” and “line-selected multi-
cast (LSM)” protocols are two probabilistic algorithms, both
proposed by Parno et al. [70]. RM protocol dissipates node-
location claims to a selected random number of watchdogs,
leveraging “combinatorics theory” in detecting replicas;
while LSM leverages the network topology related to rout-
ing to assign extra watchdogs for the claimer and employs
“geometric probability” methodology for the detection.
Zhu et al. [115] presented 2 schemes: “Single determin-
istic cell (SDC)” and “parallel multiple probabilistic cells
(P-MPC)”. Both schemes are derived from DM, and can be
employed as “network-wide deterministic multicast” proto-
col, followed by probabilistic storage and in-cell broadcast
methodologies.
Conti et al. [116] presented “randomized, efficient, and
distributed (RED) protocol”. This method combined both
advantages of RM and DM. In the state of the art, RED is
one of the most appealing clone-detection algorithms.
In [117], Zhang et al. proposed 4 clone-detection proto-
cols with the name of “memory efficient multicast (MEM)”.
Li and Gong [118] proposed a simple form of N2NB
named as “randomly directed exploration (RDE)”, in which
location claims along with the claimer’s neighborhood list
are sent so that each of the forwarding nodes on the path
fairly constitutes a line. RDE is only feasible for ideal
network model, hence detection rate might not be at an
important level even for a convex deployment field.
3.2.3.4 Defense against Selective Forwarding (Gray-
hole): There are two approaches to defend against selective
forwarding attacks:
• Detecting the nodes that selectively forwarding.
• Developing routing schemes that are more resilient
and can deliver packets even when there is a selective
forwarding attack.
One approach in detecting the nodes that are selectively
forwarding is based on acknowledgments [119]. Every inter-
mediate node that forwards a packet waits for an acknowl-
edgment from the next hop. If the next hop node does not
return the same number of acknowledgments as the number
of packets sent, the node generates an alarm about the next
hop node. However, compromised nodes can also generate
acknowledgments for the packets that they dropped, which
make this scheme fail.
Multi-path routing can be an effective way to mitigate se-
lective forwarding and blackhole attacks [59]. This requires
at least link-disjoint paths, where two paths may share some
nodes but no link. Of course, node-disjoint paths, where
two paths do not have any node in common, are better and
reduce the risk of selective forwarding attack compared to
link-disjoint paths. However, disjoint paths are not always
available, and when paths are not disjoint, if the selectively
forwarding node is the node common to all the paths, then
the attack can become as effective as in single-path routing.
Braided paths [120] may have nodes in common, but
have no links in common (i.e., no two consecutive nodes in
common). The use of multiple braided paths may provide
probabilistic protection against selective forwarding and use
only localized information.
In [121], Hai and Huh proposed a lightweight detection
algorithm to detect selective forwarding attacks in WSNs.
The proposed algorithm is based on two-hop neighbor
knowledge including two routing rules. The proposed al-
gorithm has been evaluated for WSNs and has found to be
effective even under high-density network conditions along
with the high probability of collisions.
In [122], authors describe an efficient scheme for report-
ing packet drops. They also present an effective scheme,
namely “Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test”, for de-
tecting the selective forwarding attack in a heterogeneous
sensor network. According to presented simulation results,
proposed scheme not only achieves high detection ratio but
also low false alarm rate.
Wang et al. [123] proposed a failure detection framework
to detect the selective forwarding attack. The observation
is that for a routing node, the number of packets it for-
wards must be equal to the number of packets it receives.
In their framework, each sensor node can work under a
promiscuous mode so that it can overhear the transmission
of neighboring nodes. If a neighbor of a suspected node
finds that the number of packets that the suspected node
fails to forward exceeds a certain threshold, the neighbor
can collaborate with other neighbors of the suspected node,
and the opinions from the neighbors of the suspected node
are collected to form a decision about the suspected node.
3.2.3.5 Defense against Sinkhole: An algorithm
which detects sinkhole attacks is presented in [124]. Pro-
posed algorithm first finds a list of suspected nodes, and
then effectively identifies the intruder in the list through a
network flow graph.
In Shafiei et al.’s [125] proposal; two schemes in an
effort of detecting sinkhole attacks are presented. The idea
behind these schemes is that the sensor nodes in the vicinity
of the sinkhole would deplete their energies more rapidly
compared to other sensor nodes. This is due to the fact
that, routes to the base station passing through sinkhole
are supposedly more found to be more attracting thus are
chosen more often. Therefore, an energy hole forms in the
vicinity of each and every sinkhole. The first scheme has
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proposed that base stations to utilize a geo-statistical sam-
pling methodology for detecting possible sinkholes in the
entire area of the WSN using the energy spending pattern
(remaining energies of each area) and issuing an estimator
based on the data extracted from the statistics. Depending
on the result of the estimator, base station commands all
nodes to bypass the doubtful area (possible attack region)
in their process of routing. The second scheme utilizes dis-
tributed monitoring methodology in order detecting areas
having less average remaining energy level.
Zhang et al. [126] presented a scheme for detecting sink-
hole attacks towards WSNs based upon redundancy mech-
anism. In the proposed scheme; in order to detect sinkholes,
messages are sent to the suspicious nodes through multi-
paths. By evaluating the replied messages by the suspicious
nodes comprehensively, the attacker nodes are confirmed.
Teng and Zhang [127] proposed “SeRA: A secure routing
algorithm against sinkhole attacks for mobile WSNs”. The
proposed algorithm is based on the Tiny-AODV protocol.
First, a couple of mobile-agents communicate each sensor
node to gather the network connection data to construct the
global data matrix of the sensor nodes. Then, through the
SeRA routing algorithm, the sinkhole node can be efficiently
avoided.
3.2.3.6 Defense against Sybil: In order detecting
the Sybil-attack, two protocols are presented in [128]. The
first protocol employs “radio resource testing” in which
every sensor node declares a unique-channel to each of
its neighbors. Then, it tests to see whether the neighbors
communicate with itself through the pre-declared channels.
Hence radio circuitry of a sensor node generally cannot
handle simultaneous send and receive actions on more than
one channel, the failure at the communications through
one channel might be an indication of the Sybil-attack. The
other protocol employs the “ID-based symmetric keys”. For
instance, there is a global pool of keys that each sensor
node has a key associated to its ID, and every node is
pre-loaded with these keys. The ID of a suspicious sensor
node is examined by witness nodes based on keys shared in
between the suspicious sensor node and the witness sensor
nodes.
In [129], authors proposed “rule-based anomaly detec-
tion system (RADS)” in order monitor and detect Sybil-
attack towards sensor networks on time. The presented
method relied on “ultra-wideband ranging-based detection
algorithm”. RADS works in a distributed fashion in which
every node have the ability to trigger alarms, in case they
are suspicious of a node in their vicinity. The presented
method not only detects Sybil-attack in the absence of cen-
tral management authority or a third party trusted-network-
entity but also provides defending methods against the
adversaries by using isolation technique towards both the
attacker sensor node and the compromised Sybil-nodes.
To defend against Sybil attacks, the identities of every
node should be verified. This can be done either directly or
indirectly. In the direct validation, a node directly verifies
whether the identity of a neighboring node is valid. For
example, a node may assign each of its neighbors a separate
channel to communicate and ask them to transmit during
a period. Then it checks these channels in a random order
within that period. If a node is transmitting in its assigned
channel, the node is a physical node. If no transmission is
detected on a channel, it indicates that the node assigned to
that channel may not be a physical node [128].
In indirect validation method, another trusted node
provides the verification for the identity of a node. For
example, every node may share a unique key with the base
station. When two nodes need to establish a link between
them, they verify each other’s identity through the base
station by using these keys [59]. At the same time, they can
be assigned a session key. Nodes can also be allowed to
establish links with a limited number of neighboring nodes.
Thus, compromised nodes can only communicate with a
limited number of verified neighboring nodes, which also
limits the impact of Sybil attacks.
Moreover, ID-based public keys [108] also can defeat the
Sybil attack because both the ID and location information
were taken into the generation of key material during the
initialization phase, hence multiple identities need multiple
keys, and this is impossible for a malicious node to achieve.
3.2.3.7 Defense against Wormhole: Wormholes are
difficult to detect because an adversary passes the packets to
a distant point from the point at which they are received by
using a single hop out-of-band channel. This channel cannot
be listened to by the network. Moreover, the real copy of
the packet reaches the point that receives the replayed copy
later than the replayed copy. Therefore, the replayed copy is
fresher than the real copy.
Detection mechanisms against wormhole attacks can be
based on temporal and spatial analysis of the packets. To
detect the Wormhole attack, Hu et al. proposed to use packet
leashes [68], where location or timing information is em-
bedded in packets, to limit the maximum range over which
packets can be tunneled. They require that each node either
knows its location or has a tightly synchronized clock so
that this information can be used to calculate the maximum
distance that a relayed packet could travel.
Directional antennas [130] were also used to defend
against the Wormhole attack, where some direction infor-
mation is used to detect the replayed packets. However,
these defenses target ad hoc networks and require expen-
sive hardware devices, which may be infeasible for most
resource-constrained sensor networks.
Wang and Bhargava [131] proposed to use centralized
computing to detect the Wormhole attack in sensor net-
works, in which a controller collects the location information
for all nodes to reconstruct the network topology such
that any topological distortion can be visualized. However,
the visualization approach incurs too much communication
overhead, especially when malicious nodes move around
in the entire network because each location change of the
Wormhole triggers a new round of execution of the topology
reconstruction algorithm.
Location-based keys [108] can effectively prevent the
Wormhole attack because each packet is authenticated by
the location-based key, which includes authentication infor-
mation in accordance with the position information of the
nodes. This method excludes the effects of wormholes by
attesting the position of the nodes along with their location-
based keys. Attacker nodes would simply be denied to join
the network if their location-based keys are invalid.
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Kaissi et al. [132] proposed “DAWWSEN”, a proactive
routing protocol based on the construction of a hierarchi-
cal tree where the base station is the root node, and the
sensor nodes are the internal or the leaf nodes of the tree.
DAWWSEN fights against wormhole attacks by creating a
hierarchical 3-way handshake routing tree and any attempt
of creating wormholes are discarded by this generated rout-
ing tree.
3.2.3.8 Defense against 6LoWPAN Exploit: In [133],
authors proposed a new security protocol referred to as
6LowPSec, providing a favorable end-to-end security solu-
tion that will be working on 6LoWPAN protocol. 6LowPSec
employs existing hardware security features specified by
the MAC security sublayer. However, the proposed solution
functions at the adaptation layer and has not been evaluated
by the research community yet.
A specific solution to 6LoWPAN fragment duplication
attack is proposed by Hummen et al.; the content chaining
scheme uses cryptography to verify that received fragments
belong to the same packet, so that spoofed (duplicated)
fragments would be avoided [76].
3.2.3.9 Defense against RPL Exploit: As RPL is a
newly proposed networking technology, attacks towards it
are being discovered these days. Hence, there are not many
solutions proposed in defending it against those attacks.
TRAIL (TRust Anchor Interconnection Loop) [134] , is
proposed as a generic scheme for topology authentication in
RPL. It detects and prevents topological inconsistencies by
enabling each node to validate its upward path to the root
and to detect rank spoofing on it. TRAIL also minimizes net-
work message exchanges and node resource consumption.
Hence it protects RPL against rank attack.
As suggested in [75], those newly developed defense
solutions need to be as simple as possible considering that
RPL works on low-power lossy networks. Same authors
suggest integrity check for the version field of the DIO
messages to thwart DODAG version attack against RPL.
To defend against RPL rank attacks, VeRA (Version
number and Rank Authentication) is proposed by Dvir et
al. [135]. It is a security scheme that prevents misbehaving
nodes manipulating their rank values for attack purposes.
VeRA prevents publishing an illegitimate rank value by
generating the hash chaining using random numbers chosen
by the root node. An attacker cannot change the rank value
as it requires the previous hash chain value to generate
the new one. In order for a node to change its rank, rank
authentication is needed. That is provided by the root node
consisting of MAC (Message Authentication Code) gener-
ated from the max rank hash value and next version number
as key. VeRA security scheme also prevents DODAG version
attack by providing verification to version number using
digital signature and MAC.
To defend against RPL local repair attacks, inclusion of
timer (with a long waiting time setting) to the local link
repair requests might be a good solution. Of course, VeRA
will also partially defend the network against this kind
of misuse, as misbehaving nodes are excluded from the
network.
3.2.4 Defense on Transport Layer
3.2.4.1 Defense against De-Synchronization: As
pointed out in [57], one way of defending against this
kind of attack is authenticating all of the packets being
exchanged, inclusively entire control field existed in the
transport protocol header. On the assumption that an ad-
versary cannot forge authentication, the endpoints of the
communication would detect and ignore any malicious
packets.
3.2.4.2 Defense against SYN-Flooding: Connection-
less transport protocols are immune to SYN-Flooding at-
tacks, but they might not provide the necessary transport-
layer functionality to applications. One way of defense
against this type of attack is SYN-cookies, which encode
information from the client’s TCP-SYN message and return
it to the client to avoid maintaining state at the server. How-
ever, this technique’s computational and message overhead
makes it undesirable for WSNs and IoT [60].
As stressed out in [57], usage of client puzzles is a
solution to defend against flooding attacks. The method
presented in [136] requires clients to demonstrate the com-
mitment to solve “client puzzles” in each connection. The
server or base station is dedicated to create and verify puz-
zles for each client. The Base station has the responsibility
to dissipate the puzzles to the network members (nodes)
and whoever wishing to connect to the base station needs to
solve the puzzle beforehand.
3.2.4.3 Defense against MQTT Exploit: Neisse et al.
[137] have proposed enforcement of security policy rules
at the MQTT layer, which can be used to support security
and privacy requirements. Performance results of their pre-
sented implementation show that enforcing complex secu-
rity policies introduce an additional delay of 10 ms. How-
ever, in mission-critical applications such as traffic control
or IIoT [138], any value above 1 ms may not be tolerable
and can cause system failures or accidents. Therefore, in
order to be applicable for those scenarios, the delay related
performance of the proposed scheme needs to be improved.
Singh et al. have proposed a Secure MQTT (SMQTT)
protocol which augments security feature for the existing
MQTT protocol and its variants based on lightweight At-
tribute Based Encryption (ABE) over elliptic curves. They
take advantage of using ABE which supports broadcast
encryption: With one cycle of encryption a message is de-
livered to multiple intended recipients and thus suitable for
IoT applications [79].
3.2.4.4 Defense against Session Hijacking: Light-
weight user authentication algorithm for optimized routing
in mobile networks for defending against session hijacking
attacks by Song et al. [139].
3.2.5 Defense on Application Layer
3.2.5.1 Defense against CoAP Exploit: As men-
tioned in [81], the Transport Layer Security (TLS) variant
for CoAP is Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) - it
is called CoAPs in this phase, which provides an additional
protection layer. However, this comes with a heavy cost of
additional computation and big amount of handshake con-
tent in the message, which causes message fragmentation.
16 TO BE APPEAR AT: IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. X, XX 2019
3.2.5.2 Defense against False Injection: Ye et al. [140]
presented “statistical en-route filtering (SEF)” technique for
detecting false information (data) injected in the WSN. Be-
sides, as a mitigation, a methodology is provided in order
to filter those injected data and how to achieve a consensus
on a measurement by introducing a collective secret.
3.2.5.3 Defense against Path-Based DoS: To defend
against Path-based DoS (PDoS) attacks, Deng et al. presented
a light-weight, efficient and robust method which employed
“one-way hash chains” that allowed intermediate sensor
nodes to detect replayed and spurious packets [82]. In
general, PDoS attack targets at intermediary sensor nodes
in a “multi-hop end-to-end data path” of sensor networks.
In the proposed solution of Deng et al. [82], a “one-way hash
chain” in each sensor node towards a communications path
is configured which enabled each intermediary sensor node
ability in the detection of PDoS attacks. Hence, intermediary
sensor nodes block the dissipation of fabricated and/or re-
played packets. Each packet destined from an end-point
includes a completely new “one-way hash chain” number,
thereby replaying is prevented this way.
3.3 Summary of the Security Solutions
Table 2 summarizes all the attacks against WSNs and IoT
along with the proposed defense (detection, prevention
or mitigation) solutions related to corresponding attacks.
Understanding these attacks and their associated defense
mechanisms will help researchers to provide a secure path
in building public trust and acknowledgment while devel-
oping algorithms, systems, and concepts for IoT.
Among those attacks, sinkhole and wormhole pose sig-
nificant challenges to secure routing protocol design, and it
is unlikely to devise effective countermeasures against these
attacks that can be applied after the design of a protocol
is completed. It is, therefore, crucial to design routing pro-
tocols in which these attacks are meaningless or ineffective.
Geographic routing protocol [77] is one class of protocol that
holds promise in this sense.
An ultimate limitation of building a multi-hop routing
topology around a fixed set of base stations is that those
nodes within one or two hops of the base stations are
particularly attractive for compromise. After a significant
number of these nodes have been compromised, all the
network is lost. This indicates that clustering protocols like
LEACH [141] and PCAC [142], where cluster-heads commu-
nicate directly with a base station, may ultimately yield the
most secure solutions against node compromise and insider
attacks.
4 CHALLENGES, OPEN ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS
ON CYBER-SECURITY OF THE IOT
4.1 Technological Challenges
Building up an IoT network is a challenge by itself and this
provides us a path to understanding the overall challenges
while devising security algorithms for IoT. As discussed in
[143], challenges of IoT can be summarized as but are not
limited to:
• Heterogeneity: IoT consists of a variety of devices
belonging to various families such as gateways,
switches, sensors, actuators, smart appliances, mo-
bile systems, etc. These devices all run on different
circuitry, use diverse protocols for communications,
and employ distinct data processing algorithms.
• Scalability: Addressing, naming, managing and ser-
vicing millions of devices is a unique challenge.
• Communications: Various technologies are used by
IoT devices, such as wired or wireless communica-
tions e.g., Bluetooth, ZigBee, LPWAN.
• Energy consumption: This is one of the main chal-
lenging constraints of the IoT. Any kind of algorithm
running on IoT devices needs to be designed with
light-weight processing requirement.
• Location privacy: In the regular operation mode,
things of the IoT should preserve their location pri-
vacy and when needed, they should provide this to
network administrators.
• Self awareness: Smart objects of the IoT should
self-organize themselves autonomously in order to
fulfill some pre-determined specific tasks in respond-
ing real-word environmental situations without too
much human intervention.
• Interoperability: In order for heterogeneous IoT de-
vices to communicate, collaborate and share data
with each other, there should be a pre-determined
and standardized data exchange format.
4.2 Open Issues
The rapid development of IoT, Industrial IoT (IIoT) and
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has brought tremendous de-
mand for smart-things (sensors, equipment, and devices,
mostly referred as things) which are capable of sensing
information from their surrounding, processing and trans-
mitting it to far placed locations (mostly referred as data
sinks) for further analysis and conclusions. Due to this ex-
treme demand, cyber-security of these IoT enabled devices
is somewhat disregarded [144]. Therefore, both industrially
and commercially used IoT devices are vulnerable to several
classes of attacks and possess potential back-doors to the
systems they have been attached to [145].
For instance, as discussed in [146], smart home IoT-
enabled appliances such as power switches, thermostat
controls, smoke/fire alarms, ambient lighting systems, etc.,
bring security concerns to the attention of the public as
they allow data sniffers to observe and conclude about the
private activities of the house habitants. Apthorpe et al. [147]
clearly has shown that an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
or a network sniffer can easily infer inside activities of the
house habitants and revoke their privacy even if they are
employing encryption techniques to protect the content of
data they are transmitting, by simply analyzing the Internet
traffic pattern created by the smart home IoT devices.
Because of lacking rigid security precautions and bad
user habits (sometimes the IoT implementers do not bother
issuing a user and password for their devices, and some-
times they just continue with the default user name and
password from the manufacturer), IoT devices are leveraged
as a workforce of the botnets by ill mannered hackers. An
example of this is QBot botnet, which is also known as
Bashlite, Gayfgt, Lizkebab and Torlus. This IoT botnet was
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TABLE 2
Layered categorization of cyber-security attacks towards WSNs and IoT along with the proposed solutions to defend against those attacks.
Attack type Layer Proposed Solutions for Detection Proposed Solutions for Prevention/Mitigation
Eavesdropping All layers N/A Link-layer encryption [59], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88],
SensorWare communication multicast model [89],
Key pre-distribution [90], [91], [92]
Jamming-DoS Physical Swarm intelligence [94], JAM (mapping) [95] Usage of spread-spectrum communication [93], JAM
(re-routing) [95], Wormhole technique [96]
Tampering Physical Routinely executing physical checks Tamper resistant hardware, disabling JTAG and/or
protecting bootstrap loader [63], camouflaging [18]
Collusion and Ex-
haustion
MAC Error detection codes [18] TDM, Error correction codes [18]
Denial of sleep and
flooding
MAC Anomaly detection on motes [66] N/A
De-Synchronization MAC N/A 6TiSCH [97]
Unfairness MAC N/A Usage of small frames [57]
Blackhole Network Anomaly detection on motes [66], REWARD [98],
ActiveTrust [103], Packet count [104], TinyOS beacon-
ing [105], Honeypot [100], Watchdog [101], Pseudo
clustering algorithm [106]
REWARD routing [98], Multi-path routing [59], [93],
[120], Mesh network topology [99], ActiveTrust rout-
ing [103], Isolation [104], BAMBi [105], MAODV [102]
HELLO flooding Network Bidirectional verification technique [107] Identity verification protocol [59], Multi-path multi-
base station routing [107], µ-TESLA [84]
Node-Replication
(Clone)
Network Centralized solutions: SET [110], Random pair wise
key pre-distribution [111], Social fingerprinting [112],
Speed test [113], Multi-level clustering [114]
ID-based public keys [108], Location-based key man-
agement [109], Multi-level clustering [114]
Distributed solutions: HIP-HOP [69], N2NB, DM, RM
and LSM [70], SDC and P-MPC [115], RED [116],
MEM [117], RDE [118]
RPL DODAG ver-
sion
Network N/A Integrity check [75], VeRA [135]
RPL local repair Network N/A Inclusion of timer in local link repair messages, VeRA
[135]
RPL rank Network N/A TRAIL [134], VeRA [135]
Selective forward-
ing (Grayhole)
Network Anomaly detection on motes [66], Acknowledgment
monitoring [119],Neighbor knowledge [121], Report-
ing packet drops [122], Failure detection framework
[123], Watchdog [101]
Multi-path routing [59], [120], Usage of source autho-
rization [93]
Sinkhole Network Network flow graph [124],Geo-statistical sampling
approach and distributed monitoring approach [125],
Redundancy mechanism [126]
Secure routing algorithm [127]
6LoWPAN exploit Network N/A 6LowPSec [133], Content chaining scheme [76]
Sybil Network Radio resource testing, ID-based symmetric keys,
registration, position verification, code attestation
[128], RADS [129]
Indirect validation [59], Identity verification [128],
Isolation [129], ID-based public keys [108]
Wormhole Network Packet Leashes [68], Directional antennas [130] Location-based keys [108], Centralized computing
[131], DAWWSEN [132]
De-Synchronization Transport N/A Usage of authentication including transport layer
protocol headers [57]
SYN-flooding Transport N/A SYN-cookies [60], Client puzzles [136]
MQTT exploit Transport N/A Enforcement of security policies [137], SMQTT [79]
Session hijacking Transport N/A Light-weight user authentication algorithm for opti-
mized routing in mobile networks [139]
CoAP exploit App. N/A CoAPs, employment of DTLS [81]
False data injection App. SET [140] Collective secret [140]
Path-based DoS App. N/A One-way hash chains [82]
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discovered in 2014 with the source code published in 2015.
Some variants of Qbot botnet reached over 100,000 infected
devices, serving as the precursor to Mirai botnet [148].
Mirai malware is another very good example to show the
weaknesses of the things of IoT. Mirai malware is devised
against Linux OS based IoT devices and gains shell access
of the devices to divert their operations towards the benefit
of the Mirai botnet. The Mirai botnet then uses this kind of
captured zombie devices to perform further DDoS attacks
against more advanced targets [149]. Most probably the
users of those IoT devices won’t even notice this unless
inspected carefully. Therefore, in order to address this chal-
lenge, distributed and collaborative security solutions need
to be optimized for IoT systems.
Recently revealed the Torii botnet, is a cut above both
the Mirai and QBot variants, according to researchers from
Avast, as it possesses sophistication “a level above anything
we have seen before” botnet attack has shown that security
of IoT needs to be considered more seriously than ever [150].
Unfortunately, enslavement of thousands of IoT devices
by botnets shows us that many IoT ecosystems do not even
possess basic security elements. According to an investi-
gation among commercial off the shelf IoT products [151],
the following are deduced: On average, 25 vulnerabilities
are detected per device, 60% had vulnerable interfaces and
firmware, 70% did not encrypt any communications at all,
80% failed to request secure length-ed password for authen-
tication.
4.3 Security Proposals
IoT enabled Cyber-Physical Human Systems (CPHS) are one
of the main components of the new era‘s cyber cities. As
mentioned in [152], the human is one of the key components
of the CPHS. For the cyber-security of CPHS, besides IoT
systems, human interactions with the CPHS needs to be
considered. According to [152], 95% of all security incidents
happened due to human errors. Therefore, to defeat collab-
orative attacks against human errors, authors introduced
an Intrusion Tolerant System (ITS) to support IoT enabled
CPHS. The proposed ITS employs the Byzantine-resilient
state machine approach, which combines replica diversity,
voting, and cryptographic schemes to mask a number of
compromised replicas of the nodes so that the CPHS can
resume normal operation without distortion.
In [154], a privacy-preserving home automation network
is proposed. An encrypted overlay network is created over
commercially available Virtual Private Network (VPN) ser-
vices to improve the privacy of the IoT users, especially the
ones using the smart home systems.
In [153], authors proposed employment of hardware-
based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), to enhance
and enable security-related operations to be handled at the
sensor level in IoT. Usage of PUFs will help in increasing
the security level of the IoT, by allowing low-level secu-
rity implementations on the things and also by devising
cryptography software to perform special tasks such as
verification.
To enhance the security of IoT, [158] proposed remote
attestation for trust establishment. According to authors,
this is a non-trivial task because of the complexity of the de-
sign regarding the trust attestation schemes. These schemes,
either hardware-based (e.g. PUFs) or software-based (e.g.
control flow integrity checking), demand high power con-
sumption along with extra economical cost, which is not
suitable for vast implementation in the IoT. Some inter-
mediate hybrid solutions (tailored in conjunction with the
requirements and capabilities of the things) can be pro-
posed in the near future, by blending both hardware- and
software-based remote attestation schemes for trust estab-
lishment of IoT. These hybrid solutions need to be tested
and verified for IoT, that they would able to work in scalable
conditions and under the cyber-attacks such as DoS and
against the condition of malicious verifiers.
Block-chain technology is a newly booming technology
which was proposed for digital crypto-currencies. This tech-
nology was originally designed and invented by Bayer,
Haber and Stornetta in 1992 [159] and incorporated Merkle
trees to provide the efficiency and reliability of the digital
timestamps. As discussed in [160], F.A. Hayek published
his classic book ‘Denationalization of Money’ in 1976 [161]
and argued that money is not different than other com-
modities and needs to be supplied by competition among
private providers, not by the government. Crypto-currency
has urged from that perspective, nowadays uses the block-
chain technology and is a very hot topic. Besides, it attracted
the public attention to the block-chain technology. Many re-
searchers are working to bring and provide this technology
for today’s technological needs. Block-chain-based security
algorithms provide a decentralized solution but involve
significant energy, delay and computational overhead which
is not suitable for resource constraint things of IoT. For in-
stance, authors of [155] have proposed usage of block-chain
technology in security and privacy of IoT. In their proposal,
authors employed high processing enabled miner devices,
additionally attached to the home network, to provide needs
and functionalities of the block-chain algorithms. However,
proof-of-concept applications need to be developed and
further analyzed in this manner.
A solution employing Software Defined Networking
(SDN) is proposed by [156] to detect and mitigate dynamic
attacks against IoT. In the proposed “SoftThings” frame-
work, machine learning is used at the SDN controller to
monitor and learn the behavior pattern of IoT things over
time. Anything out of the pre-determined behavior pattern
is declared as an attack. The proposed scheme would be
very effective on high processing capable IoT devices such
as gateways and switches, but will not work on low-end IoT
devices such as sensors and actuators.
Pacheco and Hariri [157] proposed a threat model for IoT
to be employed for smart cyber-infrastructures which helps
IoT network administrators in identifying potential attacks
against each layer. The proposed threat model consists of
four layers: things, network, services, and applications.
Providing security in IoT is challenging not only owing
to the limited resources of the end-devices along with lossy
communication links, but also due to the novel communi-
cations and networking technologies that are recently intro-
duced such as RPL, 6LoWPAN, TSCH, MQTT, CoAP etc.
Implications of using these technologies (one or many at the
same time) under consideration of IoT network and device
limitations need to be evaluated while taking security pre-
cautions. In this manner, researchers are working in the field
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TABLE 3
Promising cyber-security solutions for IoT
Security proposal Cyber-defense strategy
ITS [152] Byzantine-resilient state machine approach for CPHS
PUFs [153] Hardware embedded security functions
Privacy-preserving home automation network
[154]
Usage of encrypted overlay network over commercially avail-
able VPN
Smart-home security [155] Block-chain technology in security and privacy of IoT
6LowPSec [133] End-to-end security solution that works on 6LoWPAN protocol
CoAP protocol [80] Employment of DTLS which provide TLS equivalent security
MQTT-Security [137] Enforcement of security policy rules for IoT
SoftThings [156] Machine learning is used at the SDN controller
IoT security framework [157] A threat model for IoT to be employed for smart cyber-
infrastructures
and Table 3 presents summary of promising cyber-security
solutions that are proposed for IoT.
5 DISCUSSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
Section II provided all possible attack scenarios towards
WSNs and IoT. Section III presented not only the detection
techniques of attacks but also the prevention and mitigation
techniques. Whereas, Section 4 specifically considered the
cyber-security related defense strategies devised for IoT. All
these sections revealed that devising a “one-fits-all” security
solution to defend the WSNs and IoT against cyber-attacks
is non-trivial. Therefore in this section, we provide partial
possible candidate solutions from the literature that are
targeting security of some specific features of the WSNs,
especially IoT. These solutions can be categorized as follows;
key distribution, trust management, data confidentiality,
segmented attack discovery, location privacy, hierarchical
intrusion detection, redundant data infusion.
5.1 Key Distribution
In order to enhance the security of WSNs against attacks,
one should consider increasing the effectivity and flexibility
of the key distribution scheme being used. When using
encryption throughout WSNs; one of the critical issues is
how to properly distribute the secret keys among sensor
nodes when needed. Besides, revocation of the existing
nodes and addition of new nodes are other challenges to
be introduced while designing key management for WSNs.
More interested readers would refer to [11], [90], [91], [92]
for further detailed discussions regarding key distribution
and key management in WSNs.
5.2 Trust Management
Trust management is a very powerful concept to be used
in detecting misbehaving sensor nodes in WSNs. After
one of these nodes is detected by the trust evaluation,
neighbors of this node can simply stop communicating
with it. They can block the node by removing it from all
routing tables, dropping all packets destined to/from it
and stopping collaborating with it. By following this idea
of using “trust management” to cope with attacks towards
WSNs, many security methodologies and protocols are pro-
posed in the literature. However, the proposed protocols in-
troduced un-tolerable communication and/or computation
overheads and unfortunately presented limited endurance
against Sybil-attacks, DoS-attacks, and collusion-attacks. For
instance, in the trust management scheme of [12], the trust
evaluation of sensor nodes depends on the previous behav-
ioral pieces of evidence or the referrals from the neighboring
nodes. However, predicting future trust of a sensor node
depending on its historical course of trust is just ignored.
To enhance accuracy and efficacy of trust evaluation, more
trust metrics should be included, i.e. packet-loss, hop-count,
radio transmission range, energy consumption rate, data
link latency, path-quality, etc.
As mentioned above and also in [162], application of
trust mechanisms seem to be the future of WSNs in order to
secure the sensor network from attackers. Secure routing
along with secure data aggregation techniques are being
devised for WSNs, especially based upon the trust metrics
of the nodes. An example would be the “Trust-Aware Secure
Routing Framework in Wireless Sensor Networks” pre-
sented by Duan et al. [163], which employs the combination
of trust and QoS metrics in terms of routing related metrics
in an effort to provide an optimized and qualified routing
algorithm for WSNs.
In [164], Xiang et al. presented “Addition Encourage-
ment, Multiplication Punishment (AEMP)” trust model in
which each node in the network can calculate communica-
tion trust values of all its neighbors. An enhanced version
of the AEMP trust model can be devised for WSNs in order
to fight against the increasing number of attack scenarios.
Secure and efficient data transmission as shown in [165]
would be another solution avenue to prevent attacks against
WSNs. Encryption prevents eavesdropping and imperson-
ation attacks but it brings an extra computational load to
the sensor nodes, which in most cases have strict power
constraints.
ActiveTrust of [103] is also another promising security
solution for WSNs, in which trusted routing is achieved
through an active detection route protocol. In ActiveTrust,
basically the location and behavior of an attacker, along
with the node related trust, could be gathered and utilized
for avoiding blackholes while in process of real-data route
construction. This provides “blackhole” free paths for the
real-data traffic and improves network lifetime as well as
network QoS drastically.
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5.3 Data Aggregation
In WSNs, owing to the limited energy sources and com-
putation power, data aggregation among sensor nodes is
achieved at the aggregating-node and generally, this is exe-
cuted by using simple methodologies like as data-averaging.
Nonetheless, data-aggregation is not robust against node-
compromisation attacks. Hence not only sensor nodes are
generally deployed in unattended environments, but they
also lack tamper-proof hardware; they are very vulnerable
to those mentioned attacks. Therefore, the inclusion of trust-
worthiness to data management and reputing mechanisms
of nodes has prime importance for sensor networks as
well as IoT. Secure data aggregation techniques such as
Iterative Filtering (this algorithm is an appealing alterna-
tive for sensor networks hence it solves both problems 1)
data aggregation, 2) assessment of data-trustworthiness; by
employing a unique iterative method [166]), would be used
in WSNs and IoT in order to cope with the vulnerabilities
mentioned above.
Therefore, a unique way of providing security to WSNs
and IoT would be “secure data aggregation”. In the specific
applications where average sensed data is of the interest,
for example, the average temperature of a crop field, this
method may be used efficiently. Data can be averaged at
some “aggregation points” and these aggregation points
might communicate each other in a more secure way by
implementing ways of Secret Key Cryptography (SKC).
This way, more attention can be paid to this specific data
gathering points and hence more secure data dissemination
can be achieved.
5.4 Hierarchical Security Solution
Another promising technique to cope with attacks against
WSNs would be hierarchical security solutions:
Butun et al. [114]’s hierarchical IDS provides two dif-
ferent paths of detecting intruders through watchdog and
majority voting mechanisms. Multi-level cluster heads and
subordinate nodes are being watched and recorded sep-
arately, and at a specific threshold level, intruders have
revoked from the network accordingly.
In Wu et al. [167]’s hierarchical security framework, au-
thors employed dynamic adaptive chance discovery mech-
anism to detect unknown attacks. With this unified frame-
work, low-level attack-detection is executed in sensor nodes
with simple rules, and high-level attack-detection is exe-
cuted in sinks and at the base-station with complex rules.
Besides, software-defined networking and network function
virtualization technologies are used to perform attack miti-
gation when any type of attack is detected.
5.5 Traffic Shaping
Independent Link Padding (ILP) is a network traffic shap-
ing methodology proposed by Apthorpe et al. [147] in an
effort to protect smart home IoT systems from network
sniffing (eavesdropping) attacks. The proposed ILP scheme
is promising in protecting privacies of the house habitants
from unintended eyes. ILP works in a sense to shape
the traffic without violating pre-determined data rate and
schedule of the regular network traffic so that it does not
cause disturbance or loss for the data communication activ-
ities of the smart home IoT devices. In essence, the result
of the ILP procedure ends up with a constant flow of infor-
mation in which regular and meaningful data packets are
padded with redundant data so that no useful information
can be interpolated from the data traffic. By this way, the
privacy of the smart home users is assured against passive
information gathering (sniffing or eavesdropping) attack.
ILP methodology improves the privacy of the IoT users,
however, it causes bandwidth of the network to be wasted
by introducing extra load and causing unnecessary traffic.
5.6 Patch management
Patch management possesses a very significant role in
industrial networks and IIoT, in which timely patching
firmware of the critical devices has prime importance, such
as the ones in SCADA networks, that are deployed over
critical infrastructures and factories [168]. As mentioned
in [169], patching vulnerabilities of the IoT is also very
important as in the case of many computer networks, how-
ever, owing to their low-cost components, i.e. things of IoT
consists of very cheap embedded devices most of which do
not have upgradeable firmware, this is quite impossible.
5.7 Automated fingerprinting
In order to prevent node replication attacks and variants
towards IoT, an automated fingerprinting technique can be
used. In this technique, several messages emanating from
legitimate devices can be characterized, such as periodic
status update messages, firmware update messages, patch
update messages, device initiation messages, etc. Any be-
havior, out of this fingerprint can be evaluated as a suspi-
cious act or an attack.
6 CONCLUSION
The IoT is a large-scale complex architectural design consist-
ing of a variety of heterogeneous devices, therefore scalabil-
ity, transparency, and reliability are most prominent issues
to be solved. Security-related initiatives need to consider
these issues in the first place. Besides, not only should a
higher architectural security design be conceptualized, but
low-level security also needs to be addressed. This can be
achieved by designing lightweight security protocols and
cryptography algorithms that are tailored according to the
specific needs of the resource-constrained devices of the IoT.
From the discussions made throughout this paper, it can
be deduced that the heterogeneity of the devices in IoT
ecosystem along with its scalability causes several impli-
cations, in terms of security. Although some of the new
vulnerabilities can be discovered on time, related security
patches cannot be installed to the end devices in a timely
manner due to the mentioned IoT network implications
above. Therefore IDS techniques become more important for
IoT systems, as some of them are even efficient against zero-
day-attacks. If the necessary IDS techniques require high
processing power, gateway devices can be employed for this
purpose.
As a conclusion, security must be a key component when
designing protocols for WSNs as well as IoT. Without a
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TABLE 4
List of abbreviations.
AbbreviationExplanation
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol
CoAPs CoAP in secure mode (by using DTLS)
CPS Cyber Physical System
CPHS Cyber Physical Human System
CTS Clear to Send
DODAG Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph
DIO DODAG Information Object
DoS Denial of Service
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
ID Identity
IDS Intrusion Detection System
ILP Independent Link Padding
IoT Internet of Things
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
ISP Internet Service Provider
MAC Medium Access Control
MANET Mobile Ad-Hoc Network
MEMS Micro Electro Mechanical Systems
MQTT Message Queue Telemetry Transport
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PUF Physical Unclonable Function
PZ Promiscuous Zone
RPL Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks
RREQ Route Request
RREP Route Reply
RTS Request to Send
SDN Software Defined Networking
SKC Secret Key Cryptography
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSCH Time Slotted Channel Hopping
VPN Virtual Private Network
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
6LowPAN Internet protocol devised for the IoT for the usage
with IPv6
6TiSCH IPv6 over the TSCH mode
proper assessment of possible threats and inclusion of re-
lated preventive measures, these networks will be vulnera-
ble to attacks. Future researchers working on WSNs and IoT
need to consider security to a higher extent while design-
ing their routing, key distribution, trust management, and
finally data aggregation schemes over MAC, networking,
transport, and application layers.This paper has compiled
all known types of security attacks towards WSNs in IoT
context together with a description and evaluation of the
defending strategies against each type of attack. Authors
hope that this article will shed light on the researchers
working in the field of WSNs and IoT, by leading them to
produce more robust and secure network solutions.
APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
List of abbreviations are listed in Table 4.
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